I examine how the historical legacies of inter-ethnic complementarity and competition interact with contemporary electoral competition in shaping patterns of ethnic violence. Using local comparisons within Gujarat, a single Indian state known for both its non-violent local traditions and for widespread ethnic pogroms in 2002, I provide evidence that where political competition was focused upon towns where ethnic groups have historically competed, there was a rise in the propensity for ethnic rioting and increased electoral support for the incumbent party complicit in the violence. However, where political competition was focused in towns that historically enjoyed inter-ethnic complementarities, there were fewer ethnic riots, and these towns also voted against the incumbent. These historic legacies proved to be important predictors of the identity of the winner even in very close electoral races. I argue that these results reflect the role local inter-ethnic economic relations can play in altering the nature and the benefits of political campaigns that encourage ethnic violence.
Introduction
On February 27th, 2002, a carriage of the Sabarmati Express carrying Hindu activists caught fire at Godhra railway station in the western Indian state of Gujarat. At least 58 people 1 were burnt alive. The burning of the Sabarmati Express precipitated weeks of violent ethnic rioting between Hindus and Muslims throughout the state that claimed at least a thousand lives between February and the end of April, 2002 , and forced at least 98,000 people into refugee camps. Many of the riots appeared to have been planned in advance, targeting local ethnic minorities, mainly Muslims.
The complicity of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) state government, an organization with strong historic ties to Hindu nationalists (Hansen, 1999) , was suspected, as accounts of pogroms led by local members of the legislative assembly (MLAs) and close advisors to the Chief Minister rapidly surfaced.
1 The ruling party dissolved the 187 seat state assembly in July 2002, ten months early, and in the subsequent state elections, the BJP vote share rose by an average 4.84 percentage points, gaining them 10 seats. One high-ranking police o cial, who chose to be anonymous, told the author in 2007 that the Gujarat violence was 'unfinished business' from India's long history of inter-ethnic relations. He claimed that many in the government believed that by allowing the violence to happen once, it would not happen again.
The incentives for political figures to encourage mobilization on ethnic lines in order to swing close elections has been observed in settings around the world, including Africa (eg Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010) , the United States (Olzak, 1992) and South Asia (Blakeslee, 2013 , Wilkinson, 2004 , Brass, 1997 . Ethnic heterogeneity and polarization has also been associated with reduced public goods provision, lowered growth and increased civil conflict (eg Easterly and Levine, 1997 , Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005 , Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005 . And in the many developing country environments where ethnic parties favor their own with patronage (eg Chandra, 2007, Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2008) , ethnic cleansing may itself act as a response to anticipated inter-ethnic electoral competition (Jha and Wilkinson, 2012 ).
Yet, much less is known about the conditions under which poor ethnically diverse societies remain peaceful even in the presence of strong political incentives for violence. In this paper, I examine how di↵erent types of "unfinished business" in the form of historical legacies of inter-ethnic complementarity and competition interact with electoral incentives in generating ethnic violence. I focus on local comparisons of towns within districts of the western Indian state of Gujarat. Gujarat provides a useful environment to study these questions as it could easily fit within a square of 340 miles and enjoys recorded historical interactions between I draw upon work by Jha (2013b) who describes how overseas trade in the Indian Ocean was coordinated by Muslim pilgrimages, particularly the Hajj, inducing a thousand years of inter-ethnic complementarities between Hindu producers and Muslim traders at small indentations in the coast that formed 'natural harbours' on the medieval coastline. I complement Jha's sub-continent wide study of riots over a 150 year period by restricting the sample geographically and culturally to nearby towns drawn from a single state, and temporally to a single two month period of ethnic riots between February and April 2002. Using a novel set of data on Gujarati towns spanning its medieval, colonial and modern electoral history, I find that despite being larger and more ethnically diverse, Gujarati medieval ports experienced 30% fewer days of rioting than otherwise similar towns during the riots between February and April, 2002. I next go beyond this work to study the interaction between local institutions and electoral competition. I find that riots are more likely when close political races are concentrated in towns which were founded by Muslims, housed Muslim mints or political capitals, or faced a longer history of Muslim political rule-factors which, I argue, generated historical incentives for inter-ethnic competition. Thus, ethnic riots appear to be encouraged when political incentives for organizing violence intersect with inter-economic competition. I show, in contrast, that a historic legacy of inter-ethnic trade reduces the duration of riots the most in towns that housed competitive races. Furthermore, and unlike otherwise similar towns where the ruling party enjoyed vote gains in the elections that followed the violence, medieval port constituencies exhibit a vote swing of around six percentage points against that party following the 2002 pogroms. These swings were pivotal enough to shape the outcome of close races, leading to a loss to the ruling party of three seats. , 1998-2002 Relative to other towns where the BJP gained vote share following the riots, medieval ports swang against the BJP and became more competitive following the 2002 elections.
I interpret these results as reflecting the fundamentally conditional nature of the relationship between electoral competition and ethnic violence. In environments where groups compete economically, close electoral competition may provide enhanced incentives to local politicians to exacerbate pre-existing inter-ethnic tension that can readily lead to local violence. However, the presence of inter-ethnic complementarity or institutional mechanisms that support inter-ethnic cooperation appears to have a stronger mitigating e↵ect where the incentives for political violence are also otherwise stronger.
Beyond the papers already mentioned, this paper builds upon well-established literatures in economics and political science, including those examining the determinants and the e↵ects of close elections, the e↵ects of religious intensity and ethnic identification on voting, and the corresponding incentives by political figures to foster ethnic mobilization. Esteban and Ray (2007) present a model where elites from ethnic majorities benefit from providing resources for poor members of their group to riot against minorities to avoid class conflict. This resonates with Glaeser (2005) 's analysis of how incentives for politicians to send hate messages in the US South increased with calls for redistribution. More generally, CanesWrone, Herron and Shotts (2001) show that in competitive elections, local politicians have greater incentives to 'pander' to voters' sentiments by publicly advocating popular policies that they personally know will not be socially beneficial.
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In the South Asian context, Brass (1997) Dhattiwala and Biggs (2012) , also looking at constituencies in Gujarat in 2002, find a correlation between close races in the state legislature elections in 1998 and the subsequent propensity for riots. Similarly, Pathania and Tandon (2011) take a sample of riots in India between 1989 and 1995, and find that the killing was more intense where the BJP won in contested national (Lok Sabha) elections between 1989-91. Blakeslee (2013) finds that the BJP was more likely to direct the 'Rath Yatra'-a procession originating in Gujarat aimed at religious mobilizationat marginal constituencies that subsequently experienced greater rioting. Varshney (2002) describes how towns with 'civic engagement'-the development of organizations and social norms conducive to peace-also reveal a lack of violence. This paper complements and unifies these works by establishing the exacerbating role of political competition on violence when it intersects with inter-ethnic economic competition but the mitigated incentives for violence when political competition occurs among communities that enjoy traditions of ethnic tolerance. This paper also builds upon and contributes to an important literature that exploits local geographical comparisons and finds that historical exposure to di↵erent political institutional environments, particularly empires, past incidents of violence or propensities for inter-ethnic trade, can have lasting e↵ects on traits as diverse as financial development (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008, Grosjean, 2012) , trust in bureaucracy (Becker, Boeckh, Hainz and Woessmann, 2012) contemporary attitudes towards religion, voting and democracy (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, 2012) , and di↵erences in ethnic assimilation, hatred, tolerance and trust (Voigtländer and Voth, 2011 , Nunn and Wantchekon, forthcoming, Jha, 2008b , 2013b , Diaz-Cayeros and Jha, 2013 . This paper adds to these works by showing how modern electoral incentives can strengthen or undermine the e↵ects of such historical cultural and institutional legacies.
This paper also suggests a direction for additional nuance to an important series of papers that exploits proposed quasi-random variation in close races to identify the e↵ects of winner identities. Based as they are upon such local comparisons, these studies have naturally been ahistorical for the most part. Yet, just as the outcome of close races in Gujarat can be predicted by local economic incentives for inter-ethnic violence that interact with political campaign platforms, the measured e↵ects of slight victories in developing countries may depend and interact in important ways with pre-existing patterns of ethnic polarization and historical institutions.
I begin by providing a simple theoretical framework and some historical context that together motivate the empirical approach. I next introduce the data and provide the main empirical results before discussing avenues for further research.
Theoretical Framework
A simple theoretical framework can help illuminate the relationships between economic complementarity and competition and the incentives for ethnic violence that emerge both in the presence and absence of political competition. First let us consider an environment where there are just two types of agents: local and non-local (please see Jha (2008a) for details of the formal theory).
4 Non-locals di↵er from locals only in that they have better outside options. 5 Suppose that individuals from either group have the following choices every period:
to stay or leave town, to produce a good for exchange, and to attack any other agent that they encounter. Attacks are destructive, but may be useful for seizing the victim's property and to deter or punish the victim's actions."Strong" individuals may exist who are more likely to prevail in a violent attack against weaker opponents. In the environment above, an important condition that favours 'peaceful co-existence'-an equilibrium with a mixed population of locals and non-locals, full production, no outmigration and no violence-is that non-locals and locals produce complementary goods or services. To see this, consider first the alternative: that locals and non-locals provide substitute goods and thus are competitors. Then, with repeated interactions, a strong local will have an incentive to attack weak non-locals, as this allows that local not only to seize the non-local's property but also to encourage non-locals to leave, reducing the future competition the local faces. In fact, non-local competitors provide more attractive targets of violence than weak locals, as local competitors are harder to encourage to leave due to their lower outside options. Thus rather than class violence, societies where local and non-local groups compete are likely to exhibit greater ethnic violence.
In contrast, when ethnic groups provide complementary goods or services to one another, then the incentive to attack non-locals falls over long time horizons. If non-locals leave if attacked, locals will face reduced supply and higher future relative prices for goods that only non-locals can provide. Not only may there be incentives for reduced violence, there will also be incentives to invest in further complementary organizations and 'institutions' that may further reduce these incentives (Milgrom, Qian and Roberts, 1991, Jha, 2013b) .
It is interesting to consider how incentives that emerge from local ethnic complementarities or competition then interact with political incentives. Suppose there are two types of political agents. A state-level incumbent 'ruler' cares about winning majority support among di↵erent constituencies, and can adopt a state-wide policy platform that he or she will 'crackdown' or be 'complicit' against ethnic violence should any occur. Local politicians care about winning their local political contest. Suppose that state-level crackdowns on violence raise the expected costs of violence by civilians. Note that in a constituency where ethnic groups produce substitutes, the ethnic majority (which is likely to include the median voter) prefers ethnic violence to be cheap and thus the state-level ruler to be 'complicit'. This is because lowering the costs of violence makes it a more credible strategy both as a means to deter entry and in-migration and to encourage out-migration by minorities that reduces subsequent economic competition.
In contrast, in a constituency where ethnic groups produce complements, the majority is more likely to prefer the state-level ruler to 'crackdown' on ethnic violence. A 'cracking down' platform will reduce the likelihood of minority exit. If resident minorities are more likely to enjoy a costly-to-replicate source of complementarity, having the resultant cheaper minority products should provide greater benefit for members of the majority. Thus both ethnic minorities and the majority are more likely to prefer the crackdown platform when they provide complements to one another. Now consider the incentives due to local electoral preferences. Suppose that ex ante electoral preferences are shaped by historical inter-ethnic relationships and by other endowed constituency characteristics. Suppose that there is also an exogenous component to electoral preferences that can lead to shocks that also change the relative competitiveness of elections. This assumption is consistent with an important literature that documents the role played by factors beyond politicians' control in shaping incumbent electoral support, such as wins in football games, natural disasters and lotteries (eg Huber, Hill and Lenz, 2012, Healy, Malhotra and Mo, 2010) . Suppose that local politicians, having observed previous election results and pre-election polls, invest resources in their campaigns-i.e. in mobilizing their base and reducing the mobilization of the opposition. One form of such an investment lies in organizational capacity that overcomes the costs of collective action and facilitates group-level violence (Brass, 2003 , Wilkinson, 2004 .
In models with this simple setup, a robust and intuitive finding is that both local incumbent and challenger politicians will tend to devote more resources to the most competitive elections as these are likely to yield the greatest return (in terms of seats) for every dollar of campaign resources.
6 Furthermore, the state-level incumbent, ceteris paribus, will also choose the state-wide ethnic violence platform that puts greater weight on the preferences of the median voter in electorally competitive constituencies. Incentives for both local politicians and individuals in close races to invest resources to mobilize and be mobilized in ethnic riots, however, will again di↵er according to the nature of economic competition and complementarity. Local politicians in close races are likely to invest in mobilizing ethnic violence most where it is likely to be most e↵ective-i.e. where such mobilization coincides with pre-existing ethnic competition, and less where individuals have greater incentives to check ethnic violence-i.e. where there is ethnic complementarity. In this way, close races should magnify the di↵erences in violence and subsequent voting behaviours in societies where groups compete economically and where they provided complements.
It is useful to summarise the empirical implications of this simple discussion. First, the adoption of a state-wide platform complicit with ethnic violence should naturally raise the incidence of violence throughout the state, but should exhibit less contagion beyond the state's borders. Second, the ethnic violence that results from a 'complicit' platform should be accentuated in places where ethnic groups compete economically for pre-determined reasons, and be lower in places where ethnic groups provide complements. Third, electoral competition should have magnified e↵ects on violence when it occurs in constituencies with historical conditions that favour inter-ethnic competition and reduced e↵ects on violence when it occurs in constituencies that favour inter-ethnic complementarity. Fourth, voters in constituencies with economic competition should respond favourably a state-wide 'complicit' platform, while voters in constituencies with economic complementarity should oppose it. Fifth, di↵erences in the e↵ectiveness of state and local political campaigns based upon ethnic polarization in environments with ethnic complementarities and competition should lead there to be systematic di↵erences in the outcomes even of close political races. My empirical strategy uses the geographical focuses of medieval incentives for inter-ethnic economic competition and inter-ethnic economic complementarity (as well as organizations that reinforced inter-ethnic complementarity and trust) as pre-determined proxies for the presence or absence of such relationships in contemporary towns. I compare the incidence of rioting between February and April 2002 and changes in voting behaviour in the subsequent elections in towns where Hindus and Muslims enjoyed robust complementarities due to Muslim pilgrimages to geographically proximate towns within the same district where Hindus and Muslims were likely to compete for medieval political patronage and to other towns that were otherwise similar in their geographical and medieval characteristics. My identification of the e↵ects of a medieval overseas trade legacy rests on the assumption that the incentives that led some geographically proximate towns to be focuses of trade to the Middle East in the medieval period-such as their location at medieval-era natural harbours that subsequently silted up or ceased to trade-are otherwise irrelevant for contemporary inter-ethnic relations. I control for other initial geographical dimensions through which the selection of historical port locations may have created local advantages, as well as show the irrelevance of contemporary port activity as a useful placebo comparison. I also compare these towns to towns that were focuses of Muslim political patronage historically. These towns also emerged in the medieval period, were also historically attractive for Muslims, but the incentives for inter-ethnic interaction were historically that of inter-ethnic competition rather than complementarity. A little context may help clarify why such historical incentives existed and why they may have persisted.
Context
Gujarat is one of India's wealthiest states, its modern borders demarcated to leave it linguistically homogeneous and made mostly of flat plains and marsh that could fit easily within a square of 340 miles. The riots that followed the burning of the Sabarmati Express at Godhra, though initially concentrated near that city, rapidly spread to towns throughout the state as it became clearer that the state government and police were either complicit or at least unlikely to intervene. In Porbandar, a medieval port on the western coast, a respondent mentioned that attempts were made to instigate violence by outsiders, who sent women's bangles to the members of the Hindu community as a symbol of their lack of masculinity in not joining the riots [author's field observations, . Bangles were delivered to other communities in the state as well. Yet, not every community responded to the bangles with violence. Gujarat shows great diversity in its inter-ethnic relations, both historically and as historical incentives manifest themselves in modern political behaviour. With 14% of India's coastline, Gujarat has housed centers of commerce trading to the Middle East even before the rise of Islam (Casson, ed, 1989) , and has a history of political rule by Muslims that goes back to the 11th century. Hindus and Muslims within Gujarati towns have long faced incentives to interact and to develop means to mitigate, and sometimes also propagate, ethnic violence.
I build upon work by Jha (2008b Jha ( , 2013b , who documents that due to the coordination of overseas trade throughout Muslim pilgrimage, including the Hajj, which made Mecca the largest textile market in the world, Muslim seafarers throughout the Indian Ocean -who naturally had preferred access to their own pilgrimage routes-enjoyed exogenous, non-replicable complementarities with local communities in inter-ethnic trade. Furthermore, because trade was coordinated by the pilgrimage, it was relatively easy for any Muslim to enter, and intraMuslim competition limited the potential for monopsonistic rents. Mutual incentives existed among local communities in medieval ports to develop systems of norms, beliefs and organizations that reinforced inter-ethnic trust and tolerance. Jha (2013b) shows that medieval ports that were the geographical focuses of these historic complementarities between Hindus and Muslims benefited from lasting reductions in ethnic violence across the towns of the subcontinent between 1850 and 1995. Jha provides case and household level survey evidence in support of a number of institutional mechanisms: Muslims in medieval ports have continued to be specialised in complementary roles coordinated by their religious leadership, show enhanced propensities to join religious organizations, show enhanced propensities to vaccinate their sons against polio-a behavioural measure of trust in the majority community-and report less exposure to ethnic conflict in their communities. (1030), who accompanied Mahmud, to the modern day, the destruction of the temple has been seen as a Kosovo Pole-like event in Indian history, one that has polarized Hindus and Muslims against each other ever since.
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8 These patterns have shown spillovers throughout the state. In the non-medieval port town of Santrampur, near Godhra, Muslims in the Sant locality witnessed the arrivals of Hindu mobs of 150 on the 28th of February and 2500 on the 3rd of March, containing many that they recognized from among their neighbours. While most Muslims were able to flee, two were hacked to death by swords while trying to escape, and two mosques, a madrassa and a dargah (a tomb of a local Muslim saint) were destroyed (People's Union for Democratic Rights, 2002 ).
Yet, approximately one mile from these events, another mixed Hindu-Muslim area housed a temple of the Pranami sect of Hinduism. The Hindu community o↵ered protection to their Muslim neighbours, who chose not to flee and were not attacked (Burman, 2005) [pg.106]. The Pranami sect was established in 1651 by Mehraj Thakur, the son of the Diwan (Vizier) of Jamnagar, a medieval port in western Gujarat, who had followed the trading and pilgrimage routes to Basra in Iraq and had returned to organize a syncretic sect that focused on the essential similarities of Islam and Hinduism and the desirability of social interactions between the two. Later called Mahamati Prannath, the sect he founded gained around 3 million adherents around northern India (Burman, 2005) [pg.103], among these the mother of Mahatma Gandhi. Gandhi was raised in the medieval port of Porbandar and Rajkot, and would later get his start as a lawyer for Porbandari Muslim merchants in South Africa. He would draw upon Gujarati Hindu and Jain ideals of ahimsa-or non-violence-and arguably also the social traditions of inter-ethnic tolerance among Muslims and Hindus in Gujarati medieval ports in crafting his political message of non-violence.
9 please see Jha (2013b) for detailed case study comparisons of institutions of tolerance developed by Muslim trading communities, such as the Bohras, in Surat relative to Ahmedabad, as well as discussion of other medieval ports 10 It is not an accident that the BJP leader L.K. Advani, had chosen Somnath to begin his Rath Yatra procession-aimed at ethnic mobilization across the country-in 1990 (Blakeslee, 2013 ). Yet, records exist that in 1262, the authorities of the rebuilt Somnath temple made a large-scale land grant of temple lands to a Muslim trader, Nur-ud-din Firuz of Hormuz to settle in the adjacent medieval trading port of Veraval, aware of the commercial taxation and prosperity that a colony of Muslims could bring (Sircar, 1962 , Thapar, 2004 , Jha, 2013b . This ethnically-mixed community still exists, despite Veraval's diminished economic prospects
In fact, in direct contrast to the robust complementarities visible at medieval trading ports were the incentives present in towns that were the centres of Muslim political authority, where Hindus and Muslims often acted as substitutes for one another and competitors for patronage. Following the Somnath raid, Muslim rule began to spread into India, and eventually to Gujarat too. With the conquest came control of patronage and land revenue systems, based upon control of the surplus from India's mainly agricultural wealth. These patronage systems were concentrated in towns, like Ahmadabad, which were established by the fiat of the Muslim rulers themselves, as well as existing cities that became the administrative capitals of local rulers, such as Palanpur and the medieval port of Cambay (Raychoudhari, 1998) .
In medieval Indian kingdoms, political and religious patronage played a very important role. Though not necessarily members of the royal household themselves, the majority of the city's population was often tied by client relations to people who were.
11 Once flourishing cities that lost their roles as political centres rapidly became ghost towns. Following the Muslim conquest, it is likely that Muslim clients, both converts and immigrants, substituted for and competed with Hindu clients for patronage. Though "vertical" inter-ethnic links existed between Hindu artisans and Muslim patrons, such ties were often in competition to intra-Muslim patron-client relations. Though the Hindu and Muslim artisans that constituted the majority of the populations of these cities lived side by side, there was limited incentive for inter-ethnic exchange between these groups. Thus, despite the fact that, like medieval ports, political centres provided historical incentives for conversion to Islam and enjoyed historical wealth, patronage centres were the historical focus of inter-ethnic competition rather than inter-ethnic complementarity and exchange. Thus patronage centres were less likely to develop institutions to support to support such exchange, and instead were likely to continue to be loci for competition in economic spheres.
4 Data
To construct the dataset for the analysis, I went through news reports on Gujarat from the day of the burning of the Sabarmati Express on February 27th until April 15th. News sources include redi↵.com and the Times of India. These were supplemented from an amicus curiae brief by the Concerned Citizens Tribunal and a compilation of eyewitness refugee testimonial by the People's Union for Democratic Rights (2002) , which provided information about lessas a fishing port in a largely vegetarian state. Yet, Veraval too remained peaceful in 2002.
11 Thus, when the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb went South to campaign in the late 17th century, it was not unusual that four of five of Delhi's 400,000 residents left with him (Blake, 1991) .
12 Consistent with this interpretation, Field, Levinson, Pande and Visaria (2008) find evidence that violence within the city of the Muslim capital of Ahmadabad occurred within the context of competition between the di↵erent ethnic groups over property.
widely publicised violence in smaller towns and villages. Following Varshney and Wilkinson (2004) , I coded a riot as occurring in a town if there was evidence of violence by communallyidentifiable "mobs" or other large groups in that town. I also coded a day of "violence" as having occurred in a town if there was an isolated incident, such as a stabbing, without any evidence of broader groups being involved.
Following Jha (2008b Jha ( , 2013b ) I identified a town as a medieval trading port if it exhibited substantive evidence of direct overseas trade, prior to the 18th century and independent of European involvement. This definition eliminates most river ports and those ports founded by Europeans. Of the 68 confirmed medieval trading ports in undivided India, 13 are in our sample of Gujarati towns (Figure 1 .)
The Periplus Maris Erythraei (Casson, ed, 1989) , an ancient Greek navigator's handbook (ca 1st-4th century) provided the locations of a number of pre-Muslim and early Muslim ports. These records were then supplemented by the accounts of contemporary Muslim, Christian and Chinese observers, including Chau Jukua (1225), Ibn Ibn Battuta (1355), Ludovico di Verthema (1503), Duarte Barbosa (1519) and Zayn al-Din al Malibari (1528). These contemporary narratives were augmented by secondary sources (Yule, ed, 1866 , Subrahmanyam, 1990 , Chaudhuri, 1995 , Chakravarti, 2000 . Finally, every town listed in the Imperial gazetteers of India from 1907 was examined for evidence of contemporary and medieval trade and to trace its foundation and historic role as an administrative, as well as a trade, center.
Medieval ports were then linked to their geographical location using ArcGIS. This enabled me to gather data on initial conditions that might shape the initial selection of locations for medieval ports, including the presence of navigable rivers and the presence of medieval-era indentations on the coast which may have served as natural harbours.
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Looking at e↵ects over long periods of history raises a separate challenge that deviates from a canonical experiment: even controlling for initial conditions, towns under study were subject to di↵erences in external political influences both during and after the treatment that might also influence subsequent religious relations. Some component of these political influences-e.g. the expansion of Muslim or European political rule-might have been in part a result of a desire to occupy regions with active medieval trade. To account for these political channels, I compare the e↵ect of medieval trade both with and without a rich set of controls for these political factors, and assess sensitivity of the baseline estimates.
I also examine the e↵ect of Muslim political rule. If,as I have argued, Muslim political rule is likely to have rendered intensified historic and persistent ethnic competition for patronage, then a greater exposure to Muslim political rule might be associated with a greater propensity for contemporary ethnic mobilization. The presence of state protectors of local minorities may also have crowded out mutual incentives to develop local institutions of trust in towns with inter-ethnic complementarity (Jha, 2013b) . However, it might also be that longer exposure to Muslim minority rulers has a beneficial e↵ect by reducing psychological biases, as in Beaman, Chattopadhyay, Duflo, Pande and Topalova (2009) . To derive such a local measure of the historic stock of Muslim political rule, I used historical maps of the extent of Muslim sultanates and empires over time, particularly drawing on Schmidt (1999) and the medieval chronicler Ferishta (1620). Layering these maps over time gives a measure of the duration every location was under Muslim rule prior to the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707. Since, our preferred estimation involves 1981 district level fixed e↵ects, we will be exploiting the local variation of towns within the same district that acted as patronage centers due to their genesis as Muslim administrative cities, or had di↵erent extents of Muslim rule.
14 I also add separate controls for the religion of native rulers in the colonial period, relative to those districts-such as Ahmadabad, Broach, Panch Mahals and Surat-that were controlled directly by the British. Another potential reason mooted for group cooperation (eg Wade, 1988) or conflict (eg Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004 ) is the propensity for natural disasters that require people to work together or may lead to greater attempts to extract. Economic shocks due to rainfall (Bohlken and Sergenti, forthcoming), or relative income changes between Hindus and Muslims have also been suggested as potential precipitants of violence (Mitra and Ray, 2010) , while economic shocks may also encourage the adoption of religious behaviours that provide entry into 'clubs' that provide social insurance (Chen, 2010) . While the two month period of the ethnic riots in Gujarat did not exhibit much weather variation, long-term di↵erences in propensities for such shocks might also be important. Thus I collected data from the Imperial gazetteers on a number of di↵erent natural disasters from 1850 to 1900, including droughts, earthquakes, locust infestations, floods and cyclones.
To examine the extent to which past ethnic cleansing may have also driven contemporary conflict, I use the Partition-era measure of 'minority outflows' developed by Bharadwaj, Khwaja and Mian (2008) . It is the reduction of the Muslim population relative to that expected given local trends in Muslim fertility and local mortality rates of those not targeted during the time of the Partition. As Jha and Wilkinson (2012) argue, this measure is arguably a good measure of ethnic cleansing, as it gauges how many members of the target ethnic minority departed, were removed, were forcibly converted as well as were killed during the Partition period.I also build on Bharadwaj et al. (2008) to examine whether a key potential source of grievance-the extent to which a district or native state territorial unit 15 received
Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan-also may have influenced the extent of contemporary Hindu-Muslim violence and political polarization. I merged the town data to the Electoral Commission's data on each Vidhan Sabha constituency using the spatial point location of the centre of the town. While some urban areas, particularly for the larger towns, such as Ahmadabad, Surat, Vadodara and Rajkot span multiple constituencies, the old precincts that are of particular interest largely correspond to the central constituencies. I supplement this electoral data with data on town-level religious composition from the 1981 Census and other town-level data on potential factors that might also influence political behaviour-such as worker participation rates, the caste composition and literacy rates-from the town directories of the 1991 Census.
Since I argue that medieval trade incentives due to the Hajj induced complementarity between Hindus and Muslims that later were undermined with increased European intervention, modern ports can act as a useful placebo comparison, one which also allows us to control for any modern port e↵ects. For this reason, I also gathered data on contemporary port activity from the Gujarat Maritime Board.
Results
Table 1 provides summary statistics for our sample, by status as medieval port. Notice that apart from being significantly more likely to be located at medieval natural harbours, and to be coastal towns, medieval ports are statistically indistinguishable to other Gujarati towns along a range of other initial conditions and subsequent medieval and colonial characteristics, including in their propensity for natural disasters, distance to navigable rivers, history under Muslim political rule and Partition-era flows. In terms of modern indicators, Gujarati medieval trading ports seem to have equivalent levels of employment and literacy, though a higher proportion are active ports. I control for the presence of active modern ports, while also exploiting these as a useful placebo comparison to see whether it is in fact historical inter-ethnic complementarities as I argue, or instead, modern trade that might explain the results. I show that modern port activity appears irrelevant. Other dimensions in which medieval ports appear di↵erent is that they continue to have a larger proportion of Muslims than the average Gujarati town (24% compared to 17.3%), and on average are significantly larger in population than other towns in our sample. 16 In the absence of inter-ethnic complementarity, these factors are also likely to raise the likelihood of ethnic rioting. Yet, despite these increased potential risks, medieval ports do not appear a priori statistically di↵erent from non-ports in their probability of experiencing ethnic riots in 2002. Table 2 examines the determinants of the log-normalized number of days of Hindu-Muslim rioting during February-April 2002. This measure arguably captures the relative intensity of ethnic rioting that is more straightforward to observe and verify than other measures of intensity, such as riot deaths or injuries. I first match medieval ports to other towns by the initial geographical factors mentioned above that might influence initial medieval port location (Col 1), then by medieval and colonial historical factors that might influence contemporary inter-ethnic relations (Col 2). I then compare medieval ports to other towns with similar modern (but pre-riot) economic and social characteristics, including Muslim population (Col 3), and compare towns within the same district (Col 4). All regressions control flexibly for distance to Godhra and town size.
As Table 2 suggests, medieval ports experienced between 18.6% to 29.2% fewer days of Hindu-Muslim rioting between February and April 2002, comparing both between and within districts. This e↵ect strengthens when comparing towns with similar political and colonial histories, modern economic and social characteristics and comparing towns within the same district. Note that political histories and contemporary ethnic composition also increased the intensity of the rioting: comparing across districts, towns that spent longer under Muslim rule had more days of rioting (Cols 2-3), as did towns with a greater share of Muslims in their population. However, despite having more Muslims that otherwise similar towns, medieval ports exhibited less rioting. Note also that a number of modern economic indicators , such as the literacy rate, the worker's participation rate or our placebo comparison-whether a town was an active modern port-seem to be irrelevant (Cols 3-4).
Columns 5-8 examine how the e↵ect of historical inter-ethnic incentives di↵er with the extent of political competition. I use two di↵erent measures of political competition: a discrete measure-whether the vote margin between the victor and runner up was less than 5% in 1998-and a continuous measure-the logarithm of the vote margin in 1998. Notice that the average e↵ect of a medieval port legacy strengthens with these controls (Cols 5-8), and the point estimate of the interaction between medieval port is consistently negative on the 5% vote margin dummy and positive on the log vote margin measure, both suggesting that medieval ports that were the focuses of greater political competition exhibited fewer days of rioting. As the F-tests reveal, the average medieval port e↵ect and the interaction are jointly significant in all specifications. These e↵ects are consistent with the role of historic interethnic complementarities and supporting organizations in mitigating incentives for violence.
Columns 5-8 also provide an interesting comparison with medieval Muslim patronage towns, which as we have argued lacked such incentives and were more likely to be centers of economic competition. Notice that though medieval Muslim patronage towns do not appear to reveal significant increases on average in the days of rioting in 2002, and our political competition measures themselves appear to have weak average e↵ects on violence, medieval Muslim patronage towns that were the focuses of political competition saw much greater rioting. This is again consistent with our theoretical discussion: it is where political competition and inter-ethnic economic competition coincide where ethnic rioting is more likely.
One concern may be that though the (log. normalised) number of days of rioting in the two month period captures the relative intensity of ethnic rioting in a relatively observable manner, such measures may still be susceptible to over-influence by outlier towns where the rioting was most severe. Table 3 examines the extensive margin-the probability that any riot occurs in a town during this period. Notice that a medieval trade legacy reduces the probability of a riot occurring by between 13.1 percentage points and 21.7 percentage points. The determinants of the extensive margin of riots show a robust consistency with those of the intensive margin in other dimensions as well. Once again, medieval ports that experience greater political competition show lowered probabilities of rioting, while medieval patronage towns that experience greater political competition exhibit greater probabilities of an ethnic riot occurring. Once again, a history of Muslim rule raises the likelihood that any riot occurs, and once again, our placebo comparison-modern ports-seem as likely as any other town to have an ethnic riot.
17 Table 4 examines the determinants of the vote share change of the incumbent ruling party, the BJP, in the elections that took place immediately after the riots. Notice that despite an average increase of 4.84 percentage points across the state in BJP support following the violence, medieval ports swung 6.28 percentage points against the BJP in the aftermath of the riots, comparing towns within the same district (Col 4, 6, 8) . Towns within the same Notes: Geographical controls include log. distances from navigable rivers, coastal town, Natural Disasters, log. population (1991), Class of town (I,II,III) and distance to Godhra (100, 200, 300km district that were exposed to greater spells of Muslim rule also appear to have swung towards the BJP following the violence, consistent with the interpretation that rather than reducing biases, longer Muslim rule may have generated greater inter-ethnic competition.
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The BJP also appears to have made particular gains in close elections, consistent with a successfully targeted election campaign (Cols 5-8). Though medieval ports experienced an average swing against the BJP, and politically competitive medieval ports also experienced a lowered propensity for ethnic rioting (Tables 2 and 3) , the BJP's losses in vote share following the riots does not seem to have been greater when medieval ports were more politically competitive. In contrast, the BJP's gains appear to have been accentuated in Muslim medieval patronage cities that had previously been politically competitive. As we have seen these towns also were both more likely to have experienced an ethnic riot and more days of rioting (Tables 2 and 3) , and are arguably locations where political competition and inter-ethnic competition coincided.
A related approach is rather than look to the 1998 elections for a measure of subsequent political competition, we can examine whether the ultimate winner of the 2002 elections was predictable by historic incentives for inter-ethnic complementarity and competition even in those races that ended up being very close in 2002. Table 5 presents the probability of a BJP seat win looking only at those towns in which the winner won by less than 5% (Cols 1-3) and 10% (Cols 4-6).
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In fact, as Table 5 suggests, even in the Gujarat elections that followed the 2002 riots, there appears to have been no strong incumbency e↵ect for BJP candidates (Cols 3,6 ). Yet, even in these close races, the probability that the winner of the 2002 election was from the BJP was heavily influenced by the nature of historical incentives. Relative to other close races, the BJP was less likely to win in medieval ports following the riots, and significantly more likely to win in medieval patronage cities. These results suggest that the outcome of Gujarat's closest elections following the riots were not 'as good as random'. Instead, these findings appear consistent with the reduced e↵ectiveness of the BJP's broader campaign to win close elections by adopting a platform complicit with ethnic violence in towns with close races that enjoyed inter-ethnic complementarity and the higher dividends of such an approach in similar towns where ethnic groups have historically competed.
Robustness and Mechanisms
So far we have argued that the e↵ect of medieval ports reflects historical incentives for interethnic complementarity and the accompanying community organizations that emerged to support such inter-ethnic exchange. Another possibility is that medieval ports simply just happened to have less violent individuals or that attempts to instigate violence in this period just happened to be less common. Table 6 , Panel A presents the determinants of whether a town experienced any ethnic violence (both riots and isolated incidents of attempted violence) during the two months of the Godhra riots, while Panel B examines the probability a town experienced attempted violence but no escalation that resulted in riots. Notice that despite significantly less rioting than otherwise similar towns, medieval ports appear to be as likely as other towns to experience violent incidents. In fact, medieval ports that were the focuses of greater political competition appear, if anything, more likely to experience violence that nevertheless did not escalate into riots (Panel B, . Rather than stopping any precipitating events, the major e↵ect of a medieval trade legacy appears to be to reduce the escalation of religious violence into broader mob confrontation. This is consistent with the presence of community-level incentives provided by institutional mechanisms that mitigate shocks to inter-ethnic peace, rather than the presence of inherently peaceful individuals or the lack of agents provocateur in medieval ports.
If, as I have argued, medieval ports have less support for political platforms complicit with ethnic violence, then lowered political support for the BJP might also be expected in the aftermath of the preceding major wave of ethnic violence between 1990 and 1993. This wave of violence culminated in widespread riots following the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh in December 1992, with Gujarati towns relatively less a↵ected (the previous peak of 35 Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 1990 compares to 105 riots in 2002 (Varshney and Wilkinson, 2004) ). Yet, as Table 7 (Cols 1-4) suggest, medieval ports also gave the BJP around 6-7 percentage points less support than otherwise similar towns in the subsequent 1995 elections.
Another potential concern is that perhaps the vote swing against the BJP visible in medieval ports in 2002 is simply due to regression to the mean, perhaps due to higher pre-2002 support for the BJP in medieval ports. As Table 7 (Cols 5-8) reveals, despite lowered support in 1995, medieval ports were not significantly more likely than towns with similar geographical, historical or modern characteristics to oppose or support the BJP in the elections in the 1998 elections that preceded the 2002 violence.
20 In contrast, medieval
Muslim patronage centers, which, as we have seen, showed more support for the BJP in close elections in 2002, were also more likely to support the BJP in 1998. Both of these patterns appear inconsistent with e↵ects driven by regression to the mean. The focus of our analysis has been on the e↵ects of historical patterns of inter-ethnic complementarity and economic competition on the incentives for ethnic riots and the subsequent political support of agents of the party seen to be complicit in that riots. A separate question is whether ethnic violence itself a↵ects political support directly, or both ethnic violence and political support are chiefly a manifestation of historic inter-ethnic incentives and other factors. As I have argued, the escalation of precipitating acts of ethnic violence to full-scale mob riots depends directly on local support and thus is clearly endogenous to local incentives in the towns involved. Further, it is likely, as the theoretical framework describes, that political agents will have incentives to target the organization of violence more in areas where it is more likely to be successful as a political strategy.
However, as Table 6 suggests, the locations of violent events, including isolated acts, appear less clearly selected. Medieval ports were as likely as other towns to experience such violence, and there were a number of 'failed experiments': inter-ethnic violent acts which did not escalate into rioting. Insofar as there is a random component to the extent to which these precipitating events were attempted or occurred in otherwise similar towns matched along a range of observables, I can examine whether towns that isolated actors may have 'intended to treat' with riots show di↵erential voting patterns. Table 8 (Cols 1-5) examines whether a town that exhibited any ethnic violence (including isolated incidents) showed a greater vote swing towards or away from the ruling party following the violence. Notice that there appears to be no residual correlation of violence on the ruling party's vote share on average. However, medieval ports that experienced an act of ethnic violence actually reduced their support for the BJP by an additional 7 percentage points. This provides further suggestive evidence that is consistent the framework: attempting ethnic violence in medieval ports may have in fact backfired electorally, by instead mobilizing those groups opposed to ethnic pogroms. Table 8 (Cols 6-10) examines the residual correlation between the number of days of the ethnic riots that occurred in a town and its support for the ruling party. Note that, on average, towns with similar pre-independence histories that experienced more extensive rioting do show increased subsequent support for the ruling party (Cols 6-7). The residual correlation is weakened by controls for ethnic demography, modern economic factors and district fixed e↵ects, however, and the interactions with proxies for historical incentives are insignificant. This may be because of the spillover e↵ects of riots: riots may alter voting behaviour both where they occur and elsewhere. But the results are also consistent with both the propensity for riots and subsequent voting being functions of local support that itself may reflect deeper historical and contemporary economic and political incentives. , 1998-2002 Relative to other towns where the BJP gained vote share following the riots, medieval ports swang against the BJP and became more competitive following the 2002 elections.
Discussion
This paper argues that there exists a fundamentally conditional relationship between political competition and the nature of inter-ethnic economic incentives for exchange in generating incentives for ethnic violence. While it is likely that marginal electoral constituencies in general are likely to be the focus of more intensive political campaign e↵orts than safe seats, the results suggest that the extent that such intensive campaigns manifest themselves in ethnic riots can depend importantly upon the legacy of historical incentives for trade between communities. Where marginal electoral constituencies coincided with or reflect pre-existing historic inter-ethnic economic competition, as occurred in medieval Muslim patronage cities in Gujarat from 1998-2002, politicians appear to have gained local incentives to foster ethnic mobilization and violence. In contrast, where political competition occurred in societies with historic incentives for inter-ethnic trade and tolerance, such as Gujarat's medieval ports, attempts to foment riots appear to have failed. These towns also appear to have sanctioned the party seen as complicit in the violence at the polls. The findings suggest that local historical incentives for inter-ethnic exchange and competition can have important electoral consequences, particularly in environments where ethnic violence can be used as a campaign strategy. The framework, however, raises a further intriguing possibility. State politicians seeking to win marginal constituencies where ethnic groups compete should emphasize the preferences of the majority in these communities. This may lead them to adopt platforms complicit with violence state-wide, leading to a 'contagion' of ethnic rioting. Yet, the corollary may also be true: state politicians seeking to win marginal constituencies where ethnic groups enjoy complementary economic relations should also face incentives to emphasise these voters' preferences more relative to their more polarized constituents, leading potentially to a de-escalation in state-wide platforms of ethnic hatred. While proper testing of this conjecture would require multiple state-elections, and is a topic of on-going research, the Gujarat case does provide some corroboration.
Indeed, five years after the Gujarat riots, in 2007, the state prepared itself for another election. As Figure 3 and Table 1 suggest, the average margin of victory in medieval ports fell from 18.8% in 1998 to 8.89% in 2002, with 40% of seats in Gujarati medieval ports won by margins of less than 5%. Although there was an increase in electoral competition on average, which might be expected to increase the intensity of local campaigning, there was no surge in electoral rioting in the state and the incidence of riots remained below the levels of rioting that had occurred even in non-election years prior to the pogrom. Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister, campaigned explicitly on a platform of economic development, with eth-nic mobilization conspicuously absent from the ruling party platform. (Bleakley and Owens, 2010) was that the minority would 'learn its place', and cease to compete for political patronage or resources. However, it does not appear that opponents of violent ethnic domination-whether among the ethnic minority or the majority-'learned their place': towns with a long history of inter-ethnic tolerance voted strongly against the ruling party in the aftermath of the violence, when such action might yet have proven dangerous and costly. By doing so, they may have also subsequently rendered themselves electorally more competitive and thus more influential in shaping statewide political platforms on the issue of ethnic mobilization. Electoral competition has long been seen as a source of ethnic mobilization and violence. Yet, even in highly ethnicallypolarized states, when electoral competition becomes located among communities with local 21 In an interview to the Hindu newspaper, when "asked where Muslims figured in his vision of Gujarat, he flared up: I don't like this thinking. I work for five-and-a-half crore Gujaratis. For me, anyone who lives here is a Gujarati, and I will not allow politics to come into this." Vidya Subramaniam, "The Muslim Question in Gujarat" The Hindu, October 9th, 2007.
22 Ibid. 23 While accounts agree that these groups were viewed as marginal constituencies, accounts di↵er on why these communities were plausibly persuadable despite the pogroms in which they also were targeted. Engineer (2008), himself a prominent left-wing dissident Bohra, argues that Bohras and other Gujarati Muslim trading communities "are rich traders and they will be as much attracted by the development discourse as upper caste Hindu Gujaratis." In contrast, the Bohra activist J.S. Bandukwala claims that: "The Syedna [the Bohra's spiritual leader] will always seek a cordial relation with the party in power. It is in his interests, and as he sees it, in the interests of the community". See Raheel Dhattiwala "Muslim as BJP supporter in Gujarat", The Hindu, 2013.
traditions of tolerance and inter-ethnic trust, such competition may actually generate broader beneficial spillovers of peace. Ethnic riots were confined almost entirely to Gujarat. In towns in other states, ethnic violence occurred but rarely escalated or exhibited contagion. 
